The Fourth Circuit overturned the remand of two lawsuits Maryland and South Carolina brought against 3M and other PFAS manufacturers. Maryland v. 3M Co., No. 24-1218, 2025 WL 727831 (4th Cir. Mar. 7, 2025). The ruling expands the reach of the federal officer removal statute, making it easier for certain defendants to remove their cases to federal court.
Maryland and South Carolina each brought two PFAS-related lawsuits against 3M: one involving claims arising from AFFF contamination, and another limited to non-AFFF PFAS claims. 3M removed all of the cases to federal court under the authority of the federal officer removal statute, 28 USC Section 1442. The statute allows agencies, federal officers, and “any person acting under that officer” to transfer cases to federal court. To qualify, a private defendant must plausibly allege three elements: “(1) that it acted under a federal officer, (2) that it has a colorable federal defense, and (3) that the charged conduct was carried out for or in relation to the asserted official authority.” Anne Arundel Cnty., Maryland v. BP P.L.C., 94 F.4th 343, 347–48 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., 31 F.4th 178, 228 (4th Cir. 2022)). The third element is known as the nexus requirement.
3M claimed the federal officer removal statute applied because it produced AFFF for the United States military. Maryland and South Carolina sought to avoid this basis for removal by filing the non-AFFF PFAS lawsuits, arguing that because the states are not seeking recovery from AFFF contamination in those lawsuits, there is no relationship between the charged conduct and the federal authority. The respective district courts agreed and remanded the cases to state court. 3M’s appeals were consolidated before the Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit vacated the remand, holding that where AFFF and non-AFFF PFAS are commingled, determining the scope of non-AFFF PFAS contamination will inherently require assessing the extent of AFFF contamination—a determination best suited for federal district court. In reaching its decision, the court relied on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Baker v. Atlantic Richfield Company, which held that the question of whether a company’s pollution stems from its work for the federal government or more general manufacturing operations is a factual question that a federal trial court should decide. 962 F.3d 937, 943–44 (7th Cir. 2020).
The Fourth Circuit’s decision follows on the heels of the Seventh Circuit’s decision to remand the state of Illinois’s case against 3M. People ex rel. Raoul v. 3M Co., 111 F.4th 846, 848–49 (7th Cir. 2024). There, Illinois agreed it would not seek liability for “mixed PFAS contamination”—that is, sources contaminated with both AFFF and non-AFFF PFAS. Maryland and South Carolina refused to make a similar concession in this case. As a result, the Fourth Circuit believed that the factfinder will need to determine how much of the PFAS contamination stems from AFFF versus non-AFFF sources. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the complexity of unraveling those questions confirmed that 3M’s federal work is “inextricably related” to the charged conduct.
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit ruled that 3M had satisfied the nexus requirement and remanded the case to the respective district courts to assess the remaining elements. In dissent, Judge Henry F. Floyd warned that the majority’s decision expands the nexus requirement too far. An allegation that pollutants are commingled, without more, presents a connection that is “too tenuous to support removal jurisdiction.” The majority’s decision requires defendants to make only the “slightest connection” between the claims and the work the defendants performed for the federal government.
It is likely that some PFAS or AFFF manufacturers will try to rely upon the Fourth Circuit’s decision to argue that any PFAS contamination must necessarily be inextricably commingled with AFFF-derived PFAS, thereby satisfying the nexus requirement for removal. It remains to be seen whether other courts will embrace such an expansive interpretation of removal principles. For help navigating PFAS litigation, contact a member of Taft’s Environmental group.