The U.S. Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari in a case involving the federal officer removal statute on March 2. Petitioners Maryland and South Carolina sought review of a 2025 Fourth Circuit decision addressing whether 3M could remove state-court PFAS actions to federal court under 28 USC § 1442(a)(1).
Maryland and South Carolina each filed two PFAS-related lawsuits against 3M: one seeking recovery for contamination arising from AFFF contamination, and another specifically excluding recovery for contamination arising from AFFF contamination. 3M removed all four cases under the federal officer removal statute based on its alleged role as a federal contractor producing MilSpec AFFF for the federal government.
The states moved to remand the non-AFFF cases, claiming their injuries were limited to PFAS contamination from non-AFFF products and were therefore unrelated to 3M’s alleged role as a federal contractor. The respective district courts agreed and remanded the non-AFFF cases. 3M appealed both remand orders, and the appeals were consolidated before the Fourth Circuit. The court overturned the remand orders, holding that 3M satisfied the “nexus” requirement of the federal officer removal statute because a fact-finder would need to determine the extent to which PFAS contamination comes from AFFF versus non-AFFF sources. The court remanded the cases to the federal district courts to consider the remaining elements of federal officer removal.
Maryland and South Carolina then petitioned for review of the decision with the U.S. Supreme Court. The federal officer removal statute allows federal contractors to remove lawsuits “for or relating to any act under color of such office.” 28 USC 1442(a)(1). The states argued that “relating to any act” means acts specifically alleged in the complaint, which they claim is the production of non-AFFF products. 3M argued that the defendant’s theory of the case should instead be credited when determining whether removal is appropriate, and that the statute should be liberally construed in favor of removal. 3M’s stated theory of removal was that the commingling of sources of PFAS at the contaminated siteswarranted removal because resolving that issue necessarily implicates its actions in producing AFFF products for the federal government.
The states also argued that there was a circuit split among the Fourth Circuit and the First, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. 3M denied the existence of a clean circuit split, pointing out that, after the states’ petition was filed, the First Circuit ruled in a factually similar case, largely in line with the Fourth Circuit decision. 3M further argued that that the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit cases cited by Maryland are factually distinguishable, and pointed out that the Second Circuit (Connecticut v. 3M Company, No. 25-11 (2d Cir. docketed Dec. 23, 2024)) and Eleventh Circuit (Town of Pine Hill v. 3M Company, No. 25-10746 (11th Cir. docketed Mar. 7, 2025)) have yet to rule in PFAS-related federal officer removal cases.
The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately denied the petition, with Justice Alito recusing himself from the decision. One possible reason for the denial is the absence of a clean circuit split. While the Ninth Circuit case cited by the states allowed remand, that case involved opioid-related public nuisance claims, not PFAS claims. California by & through Harrison v. Express Scripts, Inc., 154 F.4th 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2025). The court found that PFAS cases are “unique,” and therefore distinct, because the federal and non-federal conduct can be “inextricably intertwined.” Id. at 1088–89. The circuit courts which have ruled in a federal officer removal PFAS case so far (First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits) have applied a broadly similar approach to the federal officer removal statute, suggesting there is no clear split at this time.
It remains to be seen whether the U.S. Supreme Court will take up this issue in a different case, such as one of the pending Second or Eleventh Circuit appeals. The venue for PFAS cases has significant implications for both plaintiffs and defendants, including differences in timing and discovery. For help navigating PFAS litigation, contact a member of Taft’s Environmental group.








